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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Anthony Childers pied guilty to rape and attempted strangulation in two different 
cases. He received a unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, in the 
rape case and a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, in the attempted 
strangulation case. The two sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Before 
sentencing, however, Mr. Childers had requested an additional psychiatric evaluation 
based on the recommendation for such an examination in his psychosexual evaluation 
report. The district court denied that request. 
Mr. Childers contends that the district court's decision to deny him the additional 
psychiatric evaluation constitutes an abuse of its discretion. The recommendation 
made in his psychosexual evaluation report informed the district court that an additional 
psychiatric examination was necessary to determine if Mr. Childers would benefit from 
psychotropic drugs as part of his rehabilitation plan. The district court erroneously 
determined that, because there was no indication in the record of a major mental illness, 
such an additional evaluation was unnecessary. Mr. Childers alleges this decision was 
improper and an abuse of the district court's discretion. Therefore, this Court should 
vacate his sentence and remand this case for resentencing after the necessary 
evaluation has been performed. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Childers entered pleas of guilty to one count of rape and one count of 
attempted strangulation. 1 (R., p.58.) In exchange, the State dismissed three other 
1 These charges arose in two different cases, which were addressed simultaneously by 
the district court. (See, e.g., R., p.58.) 
1 
charges. (R, pp.43-44, 68, 131-32, 156.) In preparation for sentencing, the district 
court asked if a substance abuse evaluation or a mental health evaluation would be of 
benefit. (Tr., p.22, Ls.14-15.) Defense counsel requested a substance abuse report, 
but in regard to the mental health evaluation, stated, "I think as far as mental health, if 
the psychosexual should pick up anything, if there looks to be a need after that we'll ask 
at that point." (Tr., p.22, Ls.21-24.) The district court permitted this course of action, 
reserving the decision to order a mental health evaluation until the psychosexual 
evaluation was completed. 2 (Tr., p.22, L.25 - p.23, L.1.) 
The psychosexual evaluation was subsequently completed and included with the 
presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI). After considering his troubled 
childhood, his lack of a prior adult record, his lack of a sexual offense record, and 
his lack of deviant sexual impulses, the psychosexual evaluator concluded that 
Mr. Childers's risk to reoffend could be ·reduced by fashioning an appropriate 
rehabilitation plan. (Psychosexual Evaluation (hereinafter, PE), p.17.) It informed the 
district court that such a plan should include counseling, as well as participation in 
both a substance abuse treatment program and sexual offender treatment program. 
(PE, pp.17-18.) However, in order to adequately provide a complete rehabilitation plan, 
the psychosexual evaluator recommended that the district court order a psychiatric 
evaluation to determine if psychotropic medications would benefit Mr. Childers. (PE, 
p.18.) The reason it made this recommendation was that "[Mr. Childers's] substance 
abuse issues may be his attempt to self-medicate and cope with his negative emotion," 
and the evaluator thought that psychotropic medications might be able to address the 
negative emotions, and so reduce Mr. Childers's desire to self-medicate. (PE, p.18.) 
2 The State did not object to this procedure. (See Tr., pp.22-23.) 
2 
Based on that recommendation, and pursuant to its reserved decision, defense 
counsel requested that the district court order the additional, recommended evaluation. 
(Tr., p.28, Ls.3-10.) The State felt that the psychosexual evaluation provided sufficient 
information regarding Mr. Childers mental conditions. (Tr., p.27, Ls.12-18.) The district 
court decided to reject Mr. Childers's request, saying, "I haven't noticed anything in any 
of the information provided in the PSI that would indicate that there is a major mental 
illness that's been spotted .... I didn't see anything to indicate that there was some 
overriding or overbearing psychological diagnosis that was at play here." (Tr., p.28, 
Ls.11-21.) While it did recognize that the recommendation was to promote effective 
rehabilitation, it determined that there was no need for the additional evaluation, and so, 
denied Mr. Childers's request. (Tr., p.28, Ls.17-23.) 
The district court proceeded to impose sentences for both charges. It imposed a 
fifteen-year unified sentence for the rape charge, with three years fixed. (R., pp.79-81.) 
It also imposed a concurrent unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed for the 
attempted strangulation charge. (R., pp.168-69.) Thereafter, Mr. Childers petitioned 
the district court to reduce his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 35 in each case. 
(R., pp.87, 174.) As he presented no new evidence in either case, his motions were 
denied.3 (R., pp.93-97, 180-184.) 
Mr. Childers subsequently and timely appealed from both judgments of 
conviction. (R., pp.99-101, 186-88.) He contends that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his request for the additional psychiatric evaluation and, without 
the information from that evaluation, did not have sufficient information to formulate a 
3 Neither of these denials is challenged on appeal. 
3 
complete rehabilitation plan. Therefore, he contends the district court improperly 
imposed his sentences. 
4 
ISSUE 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Order The Requested 
Psychiatric Evaluation 
Introduction 
The district court had ordered a psychosexual evaluation in preparation for 
sentencing in this case. That evaluation returned with the recommendation that a 
psychiatric evaluation be performed in order to fully determine what treatment 
Mr. Childers needed in order to effectively rehabilitate. Accordingly, defense counsel 
requested the district court order that evaluation. The district court, however, refused to 
permit the evaluation. That refusal constitutes an abuse of discretion, and this Court 
should remedy that abuse by vacating Mr. Childers's sentence and remanding his case 
for a resentencing complying with the relevant statutory provisions. 
B. The Psychiatric Evaluation Was Required For The District Court To Be Able 
To Sufficiently Consider The Risks And Benefits of Treatment, As Required 
By Statute 
The decision of whether to order a psychological or psychiatric evaluation is 
within the district court's discretion. State v. Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 732 (Ct. App. 
2011). That discretion is guided by I.C. § 19-2522 and I.C.R. 32 (hereinafter, Rule 32). 
State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822 (Ct. App. 2010). If the defendant's mental 
condition will be a factor at sentencing, the district court is required to appoint at least 
one psychiatrist or psychologist to assess the defendant. Id. (citing I.C. § 19-2522). 
Among the factors that evaluation must address are: "[a] consideration of whether 
treatment is available for the defendant's mental condition; [and a]n analysis of the 
relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatement .... " I.C. § 19-2522(3)(d)-(e). 
The district court's decision to not order an evaluation will only be upheld if the 
6 
information in the record adequately addresses the requirements set forth in I. C. § 19-
2522(3) or if there is no reason to believe the defendant's mental condition will be a 
significant factor at sentencing. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822; State v. McFarland, 125 
Idaho 876, 879 (Ct. App. 1994). Because Mr. Childers requested the additional, 
recommended evaluation,4 the district court abused its discretion when it failed to order 
that evaluation because without it, the record does not adequately address two of the 
requirements set forth in I.C. § 19-2522(3) and Mr. Childers's mental conditions were a 
significant factor at sentencing. See Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822; McFarland, 125 
Idaho at 879. 
The district court ordered that a psychosexual evaluation be performed on 
Mr. Childers in preparation for sentencing. (Tr., p.22, Ls.5-6.) It also reserved its 
decision as to whether to order additional psychiatric or psychological evaluations 
"depending on what shows up [in the psychosexual evaluation]." (Tr., p.22, L.21 - p.23, 
L.1.) The psychosexual evaluator made several recommendations for Mr. Childers's 
participation in various treatment programs, but also recommended that "he have a 
psychiatric evaluation to determine if psychotropic medications would be of benefit to 
him." (PE, p.18.) The reason for such a recommendation was that "[h]is substance 
abuse issues may be his attempt to self-medicate and cope with his negative emotion." 
(PE, p.18.) This demonstrates that the psychosexual evaluator was unable to fully 
assess the appropriate treatment necessary to help Mr. Childers rehabilitate, and thus, 
provide more protection to society. (See PE, p.18.) In order for the district court to have 
discretion to not order additional mental evaluations, the record must demonstrate what 
4 Unlike many of the defendants in these other cases, see, e.g., Hanson, 150 Idaho 
729; Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, Mr. Childers actually requested the district court order 
the evaluation. (Tr., p.28, Ls.3-10.) 
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treatment is available for the defendant, as well as assess the risks of treatment and 
nontreatment. I.C. § 19-2522(3)(d)-(e). As this record is missing information regarding 
the availability of certain treatment, based on Mr. Childers's condition, and so cannot 
provide an adequate assessment of the risks of treatment and nontreatment in that 
regard, the record does not provide adequate information to meet the requirements of 
either I.C. § 2522(3)(d) or (3)(e). Therefore, the district court's refusal to order the 
additional psychiatric evaluation was an abuse of discretion. See Jockumsen, 148 
Idaho at 822. 
The only other reason why the district court might not abuse its discretion in 
failing to order a psychiatric report is if it finds that "there was no reason to believe a 
defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor" at sentencing. Id. (emphasis 
added). The district court did find that nothing in the PSI "would indicate that there is a 
major mental illness that's been spotted .... I didn't see anything to indicate that there 
was some overriding or overbearing psychological diagnosis that was at play here."5 
(Tr., p.28, Ls.11-15 (emphasis added).) The district court's finding does not excuse its 
denial of the psychiatric evaluation because "mental conditions" are not limited to only 
"major mental illnesses" or "overriding or overbearing psychological diagnoses." 
See Rule 32(b)(1). 
5 This determination by the district court is troubling because the PSI does, in fact, 
indicate that a major mental illness, namely bipolar disorder, was potentially an issue in 
Mr. Childers's condition: "[Mr. Childers] told Dr. Hatzenbuehler [during the psychosexual 
evaluation] that he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and 
Bipolar Disorder when he was in foster care .... " (PSI, p.11.) As such, its finding that 
no major mental illnesses had been spotted and no psychological diagnoses were at 
play is highly suspect, if not clearly erroneous. 
8 
For example, the term "mental illness" is broadly defined as: "A disorder in 
thought or mood so substantial that it impairs judgment, behavior, perceptions of reality, 
or the ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 454 
(3rd pocket ed. 2006). The psychosexual evaluator specifically found that Mr. Childers 
is emotionally immature, and thus, "has not been able to sustain an independent adult 
lifestyle for very long." (PE, p.17.) This determination by the psychosexual evaluator 
meets the definition of "mental illness," which means that Mr. Childers's emotional 
immaturity constitutes a mental condition, and as a mental condition, the district court 
was required to consider it at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). 
It is clear that this condition, when combined with Mr. Childers's substance abuse 
issues potentially being used to cope with negative emotions (which have led to at least 
one suicide attempt (PSI, p.11 )), should have been a significant factor in his 
sentencing.6 Compare State v. French, 95 Idaho 853, 854-55 (1974). 
Additionally, having been informed of such a finding, the presentence investigator 
was required to make a "recommendation regarding a psychological examination and a 
plan of rehabilitation." Rule 32(b)(10). The psychosexual evaluator, informed both the 
presentence investigator and the district court that an additional examination was 
required in order to develop a complete and comprehensive plan of rehabilitation. 
(PE, p.18.) Without an adequate plan of rehabilitation in the record, the decision to 
forego the additional evaluation is, therefore, an abuse of discretion, and the district 
court imposed sentence without sufficient information to consider the treatment options 
available, as well as the risks of treatment and nontreatment. I.C. § 19-2522(3)(d)-(e). 
6 If the district court did not consider it so, then it insufficiently considered Mr. Childers's 
mental condition, and so abused its discretion in that way as well. See, e.g., Hollon, 
132 Idaho at 581; State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). 
9 
Since the psychosexual evaluator informed the district court that it was 
necessary to get more information on the potential benefits psychotropic mediations 
might have in treating Mr. Childers's substance abuse issues, the failure of the district 
court to order the requested evaluation constitutes an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 
Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822; McFarland, 125 Idaho at 881. As such, this Court should 
vacate Mr. Childers's sentences and remand the case for resentencing, which includes 
the necessary evaluations, compliant with I.C. § 19-2522. See, e.g., McFarland, 125 
Idaho at 881. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Childers respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and 
remand his case for resentencing after the necessary evaluation has been performed. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 2012. 
./"' .7 / 
~-- /i/ /:;:<L_ 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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